The existence of a value and optimal strategies is proved for the class of two-person repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players' actions and at the beginning of each stage only Player 1 is informed about the state. The results apply to the case of standard signaling where players' stage actions are observable, as well as to the model with general signals provided that Player 1 has a nonrevealing repeated game strategy. The proofs reduce the analysis of these repeated games to that of classical repeated games with incomplete information on one side.
Introduction
The class of two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players' actions, and at the beginning of each stage only Player 1 is informed about the state, and players' stage actions are observable, is termed in Renault (2006) Markov chain games with incomplete information on one side.
The play of a Markov chain game with incomplete information on one side proceeds as follows. Nature chooses the initial state z 1 in the finite set of states M according to an initial probability q 0 . At stage t Player 1 observes the current state z t ∈ M and chooses an action i t in the finite set of actions I and (simultaneously) Player 2 (who does not observe the state z t ) chooses an action j t in the finite set of actions J . Both players observe the action pair (i t , j t ). The next state z t+1 depends stochastically on z t only; i.e., it depends neither on t, nor on current or past actions, nor on past states. Thus the states follow a Markov chain with initial distribution q 0 and transition matrix Q on M. The payoff at stage t is a function g of the current state z t and the actions i t and j t of the players.
Formally, the game is defined by the 6-tuple M, Q, q 0 , I, J, g where M is the finite set of states, Q is the transition matrix, q 0 is the initial probability of z 1 ∈ M, I and J are the state-independent action sets of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively, and g : M × I × J → R is the stage payoff function.
The transition matrix Q and the initial probability q 0 define a stochastic process on sequences of states by P(z 1 = z) = q 0 (z) and P(z t+1 = z | z 1 , . . . , z t ) = Q z t ,z .
A pure, respectively, behavioral, strategy σ of Player 1 in the game that is defined by M, Q, q 0 , I, J, g is a sequence of functions σ t : (M × I × J ) t−1 × M → I (σ t : (z 1 , i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i t−1 , j t−1 , z t ) → I ), respectively → (I ) (where for a finite set D we denote by (D) all probability distributions on D). A pure, respectively behavioral, strategy τ of Player 2 is a sequence of functions τ t : (I × J ) t−1 → J , respectively → (J ).
A pair σ, τ of pure (mixed, or behavioral) strategies (together with the initial distribution q 0 ) induces a stochastic process with values z 1 , i 1 , j 1 , . .
. , z t , i t , j t , . . . in (M × I × J ) ∞ , and thus a stochastic stream of payoffs g t := g(z t , i t , j t ).
A strategy σ * (respectively, τ * ) of Player 1 (respectively, 2) guarantees v if for all sufficiently large n, E q 0 σ * ,τ 1 n n t=1 g t ≥ v (respectively, E q 0 σ,τ * 1 n n t=1 g t ≤ v) for every strategy τ (respectively, σ ) of Player 2 (respectively, 1). We say that Player 1 (respectively, 2) can guarantee v in (q 0 ) if for every ε > 0 there is a strategy of Player 1 (respectively, 2) that guarantees v − ε (respectively, v + ε).
The game has a value v if each player can guarantee v. A strategy of Player 1 (respectively, 2) that guarantees v − ε (respectively, v + ε) is called an ε-optimal strategy, and a strategy that is ε-optimal for every ε > 0 is called an optimal strategy. Renault (2006) proved that the Markov chain game has a value v and Player 2 has an optimal strategy. The present paper (1) shows that Renault's result follows from the classical results of repeated games with incomplete information (Aumann and Maschler 1995) ; and (2) proves the existence of an optimal strategy for Player 1. Thus,
Theorem 1 The Markov chain game has a value and both players have optimal strategies.
In addition, these results are extended in the present paper to the model with signals.
Section 2 presents a proof of Renault's results Renault (2006) that the Markov chain game has a value and that Player 2 has an optimal strategy, and sketches the proof of the existence of an optimal strategy of Player 1. Section 3 introduces a class of auxiliary repeated games with incomplete information that serves in the proof of Theorem 1 as well as in approximating the value of . Section 4 couples the Markov chain with stochastic processes that enable us to reduce the analysis of a Markov chain game to that of a classical repeated game with incomplete information on one side. Section 5 contains the proof of Theorem 1.
Section 6 extends the model and the results to Markov games with incomplete information on one side and signals, where players' actions are unobservable and each player only observes a signal that depends stochastically on the current state and actions. The proof for the model with signals requires only minor modification. For simplicity of notation and exposition, albeit at the cost of some repetition, we introduce the games with signals only after completing the proof of Theorem 1.
Informal proofs
The proofs are based on the observation that if (z t ) t is a Markov chain then for properly chosen sequences n i <n i < n i+1 , the Markov chain has with probability close to 1 entered at stage n 1 + 1 a communicating class C, and, conditional on the entered communicating class C, the processes z[i] = z n i +1 , . . . , zn i , i ≥ 1, are almost independent, and the distributions of the initial states in the ith block of stages z n i +1 , i ≥ 1, are almost identical.
Therefore, a slight alternation of the process (z t ) leads to a process (z t ) t such thatz n 1 +1 is in one of the communicating classes C, and, conditional onz 
For the proofs that Markov games have a value and that Player 2 has an optimal strategy, the finite sequencesz[i] will all have the same length, and the game
. .) will be a classical repeated game with incomplete information on one side. For the proof of the existence of an optimal strategy of (the informed) Player 1, the lengths of the finite sequencesz[i] will converge to infinity, and the proof that Player 1 has an optimal strategy in (z [1],z[2] , . . .) and in ((z t ) t ) will rely also on the structure of approximate optimal strategies of the informed player in repeated games with incomplete information on one side.
The ((z t ) t ) . The sets of strategies of (the uninformed) Player 2 in both games are identical. In addition, the construction of (z t ) t will be such that for most stages t the probability that z t =z t is close to one. Therefore a strategy of Player 1 (respectively, 2) that guarantees v in the game
The natural lifting of a strategy in the game (z [1],z[2] , . . .) to a strategy in ((z t ) t ) (and thus to a strategy in ((z t ) t )) is obtained by considering stages t ≤ n 1 and n i < t ≤ n i+1 redundant and playing nonrevealingly in these redundant stages.
Now we turn to the details of the construction. First, we recall basic terminology and facts regarding (stationary/homogeneous) Markov chains with a finite state space M and transition matrix Q. For a positive integer n, an M × M matrix Q, and z, z ∈ M, we denote by Q n z,z (or Q n (z, z )) the (z, z )-th entry of the matrix Q n ; if Q is a transition matrix then Q n z,z is the probability that we move from z to z in n steps when the single-step transition probabilities are defined by Q.
Fix a finite transition matrix Q. A state z ∈ M is recurrent if n Q n z,z = ∞, equivalently, if the Markov chain that starts at z returns to z with probability 1. A state z communicates with a set z if there are positive integers n and m such that Q n z,z > 0 and Q m z ,z > 0. A set of states C is a communicating class (or ergodic set) if every state in C communicates with any other state of C and no state of C communicates with a state outside C. Every state in a communicating class is recurrent. The period of a state z is the greatest common devisor of all n such that Q n z,z > 0. A state is aperiodic if its period is 1. Obviously, if Q z,z > 0 then z is aperiodic. All states in the same communicating class have the same period.
A
Every communicating class C has a unique invariant distribution k C ∈ (C) that is Q-invariant, and if z ∈ C is aperiodic, then for every z, z ∈ C the limit of Q n z,z exists and equals k C (z ). The set {k C : C a communicating class} depends obviously on the transition matrix Q and is denoted K (Q). Equivalently, K (Q) is the (nonempty finite) set of the extreme point of the (polytope of) Q-invariant probability distribution.
Next, we state and prove a simple lemma regarding Markov chains. 
Proof Let R be the set of all recurrent states of the Markov chain with state space M and transition matrix Q. For every recurrent z ∈ R there is 0
z,z > 0. Therefore, there is n > 0 (e.g., n = |M|! or the least common multiple of
Let C be a communicating class of the transition matrix Q n . Note that if z ∈ C and Q mn z,z > 0 for some 0 < m ≤ |M| then Q m n z,z > 0 for every m ≥ m, and there is m ≤ |M| such that Q m n z ,z > 0 (otherwise z is not a recurrent state of the transition matrix Q n ). Therefore, there is m (e.g., m = |M|) such that Q mn z,z > 0 for some z ∈ C implies that (z ∈ C and) Q mn z ,z > 0. In particular, all reccurent states of the transition matrix Q mn are aperiodic (with respect to the transition matrix Q mn ).
where m is given by Lemma 1, and let p(k) be the limit (as → ∞) of the probability that z m+1 is in the support S(k) of the invariant probability
Fix ε > 0 and a uniform [0, 1]-valued random variable X (equivalently, a sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . of independent uniform [0, 1]-valued random variable) that is independent of the process (z t ) t . If n i andn i are multiples of m, and n 1 and min i (n i+1 −n i ) are sufficiently large, we can define a new process (z t ) such that (1)z t is a function of z 1 , . . . , z t and X , (2) 
is a sequence of independent Markov chains with initial probability k and transition matrix Q, and (3) the probability thatz
kz . For i > 1 we denote byĀ i kz the intersection of the events z n i +1 = z,Ā 1 k , and
≤ 1, where zn i−1 +1 = z . Note that for sufficiently large n 1 we
, and for sufficiently large min i (n i − n i ) we have
It is now easy to complete the definition of the sequencez[1],z[2], . . . (on those parts of the probability space where it is not defined by the above rules) so that that the process (z t ) obeys (1)-(3). For example, if (z t ) t is a process that is independent of X and (z t ) t , and where (z[i] ) i is a sequence of independent Markov chains with initial probability k and transition matrix Q,
In order to prove that has a value and that Player 2 has an optimal strategy we set ( p, m) . Each player can follow his optimal strategy in this auxiliary repeated game in stages n i < t ≤ n i + m of the Markov game (where Player 1 computes the statez t as a function of the process and the private signal/lottery X and plays nonrevealingly in the other stages) to guarantee in the Markov game a payoff within O(ε + / ) of v( p, m) . Therefore, the limit lim →∞ v( p, m) exists and equals the value of the Markov game. Note that Player 2 can start following his auxiliary repeated game strategy at any stage n i + 1. Therefore Player 2 can paste his ε-optimal strategies in the games ( p, m) into an optimal strategy in the Markov game.
The sketched proof above provides an alternative proof to the results of Renault (2006) that a Markov game with standard signaling has a value and that Player 2 has an optimal strategy.
Patching ε-optimal strategies of Player 1 into an optimal strategy is more involved, and relies on a more detailed description and properties of approximate optimal strategies in ( p, m).
The additional needed care stems from the irreversibility of the revelation of information about the process, and the fact that information about the aperiodic class that is revealed to Player 2 when Player 1 plays an optimal strategy in ( p, m) depends on . Therefore, the constructed optimal strategy of Player 1 has the following characteristics. First, the starting time n 1 + 1 of Player 1 using/revealing his information about the Markov chain is a random time, which Player 1 can compute as a function of past states z 1 , . . . , z n 1 +1 of the chain and the auxiliary private lottery X and with the property that for every z in the support of k ∈ K we have P(
Second, the length of the ith stage of the auxiliary game is 2 i m and whatever information revealed eventually by the optimal strategy of Player 1 can be communicated to Player 2 before Player 1 makes his mixed action choice at stage n 1 + 1.
Let us recall a few basic facts about repeated games with incomplete information. Let G q be the -stage repeated game where nature chooses a Markov chain z 1 , . . . , z with transition matrix Q and initial probability P(z 1 = z) = q(k)k(z) for z in the support of k ∈ K . Equivalently, nature chooses k ∈ K with probability q(k) and then a Markov chain with transition matrix Q and initial distribution k. The state z t is revealed to Player 1 just before the play at stage t. At stage t the players choose an action i t ∈ I and an action j t ∈ J , and following the play at stage t Player 2 observes a stochastic signal s 2 whose conditional distribution given the past is a function of the triple (z t , i t , j t ). (In the case of standard signaling s 2 = (i t , j t ).) The payoff to Player 1 of the play z 1 , i 1 , j 1 , . . . , z , i , j is the average of the stage payoffs g(z t , i t , j t ). Let u (q) denote the maxmin of G q where Player 1 maximizes over his nonseparating strategies. It is known (Aumann and Maschler 1995) that the value of the game ( p, ) is the maximum over all convex combinations
We select a sequence of j ↑ ∞ so that (1) 
Note that α(i) and p(i) are independent of j and hence the need for an approximation. The fact that α(i) and p(i) are independent of j enables us to patch together approximate optimal strategies of the games ( p, 2 j m) and obtain an optimal strategy of Player 1 in the Markov game.
Define n 0 = 0 and for i ≥ 0 set n i+1 = n i + 2 i m + i m andn i = n i + 2 i m. The optimal strategy of Player 1 will use the information of the states only in stages
. . , zn i . We couple the process (z t ) t with a process (z t ) t so that for some positive-integer-valued function T , where the event T = i is a function of z 1 , . . . , z n i +1 and the coupling enabling [0, 1]-valued random variable X (which is independent of the process (z t )), we have (1) z n T +1 is a recurrent state of the Markov chain with transition Q m , (2) conditional on z n T +1 ∈ S(k) the processz[T + i] = z n T +i +1 , . . . ,z n T +i is a Markov chain with initial probability k and transition Q, (3) conditional on z n T +1 ∈ S(k) the processesz The properties of the auxiliary coupled process (z t ) t enables us to patch the approximate optimal strategies of Player 1 in the games G into an optimal strategy in the Markov game.
The auxiliary repeated games (p, )
The analysis of the game (q 0 ) is by means of auxiliary repeated games with incomplete information on one side, with a finite state space K , initial probability p, and stage game G k .
The stage game G k, , or G k for short, is a game in extensive form. More explicitly, it is an -stage game with incomplete information on one side. Nature chooses r = (z 1 = z, . . . , z ) ∈ M where z ∈ M is chosen according to the probability k, and z 1 = z, . . . , z follow the law of the Markov chain with transition matrix Q; before Player 1 takes his action at stage t ≤ he is informed of z t , but Player 2 is not informed of z t . Stage actions are observable. 1 Note that G k is a finite game with finite strategy sets A for Player 1 and B for Player 2. An element a ∈ A, respectively, b ∈ B, is a sequence of functions a t , respectively, b t , 1 ≤ t ≤ , where a t : (z 1 , i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i t−1 , j t−1 , z t ) → I , respectively, b t : (i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i t−1 , j t−1 ) → J . The triple (r, a, b) defines a play (z 1 , i 1 , j 1 , . . . , z , i , j ) . Therefore, the triple (k, a, b) defines a probability distribution on the plays (z 1 , i 1 , j 1 
where the expectation is with respect to the probability defined by (k, a, b) .
The game ( p, )
Nature chooses k ∈ K with probability p(k). Player 1 is informed of k; Player 2 is not. The play proceeds in stages. In stage n, nature chooses r = (z 1 , . . . , z ) ∈ M with probability k(z 1 ) 1≤t< Q z t ,z t+1 , Player 1 chooses a ∈ A, and Player 2 chooses b ∈ B. The payoff to Player 1 is G k (a, b) .
The signal s 2 to Player 2 is the function s 2 that assigns to the triple (r, a, b) the sequence of realized stage actions i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i , j . The signal s 1 to Player 1 is the function s 1 that assigns to the triple (r, a, b) the play (z 1 , i 1 , j 1 , . . . , z , i , j ) .
The value of ( p, ) exists by Aumann and Maschler (1995, Theorem C, p. 191 
is the value of (Corollary 2). Lemma 3, respectively Lemma 4, demonstrates the existence of an optimal strategy of Player 2, respectively, Player 1.
Auxiliary coupled processes
Let m, K = K (Q m ), and p ∈ (K ), as defined in Sect. 2. Recall that the support of a probability distribution k ∈ (M) is denoted S(k).
An admissible pair of sequences is a pair of increasing sequences, (n i ) i≥1 and (n i ) i≥1 , with n i <n i < n i+1 and such that n i andn i are multiples of m. For a given admissible pair of sequences and a stochastic process (x t ) we use the notation
. , xn i ).

A coupling result
Let (n i ) i≥1 and (n i ) i≥1 be an admissible pair of sequences with (n i −n i−1 ) i>1 nondecreasing and with n 1 sufficiently large so that for every k ∈ K and z ∈ S(k)
. . be a sequence of iid random variables that are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and so that the process (z t ) t (that follows the Markov chain with initial distribution q 0 and transition matrix Q) and the random variable (X, X 1 , Y 1 , . . .) are independent. Let F i denote the σ -algebra of events generated by X 1 , . . . , X i and z 1 , . . . , z n i +1 .
For k ∈ K and z ∈ S(k) the event z n i +1 = z is denoted A i kz . Let A i k be the event that z n i +1 ∈ S(k), i.e., A i k = ∪ z∈S(k) A i kz , and
for every k ∈ K and 2ε 1 < 1. Moreover, as each k ∈ K is invariant under Q m , we can choose such a sequence for
and thus we can assume that ε 1 = ε 1 (n 1 ) → n 1 →∞ 0.
A positive-integer-valued random variable T such that for every i ≥ 1 the event {T = i} is F i -measurable is called an (F i ) i -adapted stopping time. We will define an (F i ) i -adapted stopping time T with T ≥ 1 such that conditional on {T = i} the process z[T + j] ( j ≥ 0) is with probability p(k) a Markov chain with initial probability k and transition Q. Because the distribution k is invariant under Q m and n i+1 −n i is a multiple of m, it suffices to guarantee that for every k ∈ K and every z ∈ S(k) the probability that z n i +1 = z, conditional on T = i, equals p(k)k(z). In addition, our construction is such that T is finite with probability 1 (equivalently, P(T ≤ i) → i∞ 1). In fact, by requiring in addition that P(T ≤ i) = 1 − 2ε i the stopping time T is defined as follows.
Define the (F i ) i -adapted stopping time T with T ≥ 1 by defining the event {T = i} recursively: 2
for every fixed i ≥ 0 the process z[T + i] is a
Markov chain with initial probability k and transition Q;
kz denote the event that T ≤ i and z n i +1 = z ∈ S(k), and
k and note that P(B i ) = 1 − 2ε i . This completes the proof of (i) and (iii).
Obviously, z[T +i] is a Markov chain with transition Q. As k is invariant under Q m we deduce that for every i ≥ 0 we have Pr(z n T +i +1 = z ∈ S(k) | z n T +1 ∈ S(k)) = k(z), which proves (ii).
The next lemma couples the process (z t ) t with a process (z * t ) t where the states z * t are elements of M * = M ∪{ * } with * / ∈ M. Given i ≥ 1 we denote by * [i] the sequence of * s of lengthn i − n i . Let 0 < δ < 1 be such that for every k ∈ K , and y, z ∈ S(k),
Lemma 3 There exists a stochastic process (z * t ) t with values z * t ∈ M * such that for n i < t ≤n i the (auxiliary) state z * t is a (deterministic) function of z 1 , . . . , z t and
on B T +i (and thus with probability = 1 − δ T +i ) is a Markov chain with initial probability k and transition Q, and on the complement of B T +i (and thus with conditional probability
Proof ∀n i−1 < t ≤ n i and ∀t ≤ n T , set z * t = * ; in particular, 
, where j = T + i. Note that this conditional probability is independent of y. Therefore, the conditional probability that
which proves (iv) and (v).
Corollary 1 There exists a stochastic process (z t ) t with valuesz t ∈ M such that for n i < t ≤n i the (auxiliary) statez t is a (deterministic) function of z 1 , . . . , z t and
Markov chain with initial probability k and transition Q 1.3 Pr(z[
Proof Let k andz[k, i], k ∈ K and i ≥ 1, be independent random variables such that Pr(k = k) = p(k) and each random variablez[k, i] is a Markov chain of length n i − n i with initial distribution k and transition matrix Q. W.l.o.g. we assume that k andz[k, i], k ∈ K and i ≥ 1, are deterministic functions of X .
Setz t = z t for t ≤ n T and forn
Existence of the value and optimal strategies in (q 0 )
Assume without loss of generality that all payoffs of the stage games g (z, i, j) 
Lemma 4 Player 1 can guaranteev( p) and Player 2 can guarantee v( p).
Proof Note that for
Setn 0 = 0, and for i ≥ 1,n i = i( + 2 )m +¯ m and n i =n i−1 + m +¯ m where¯ is 3 a nonnegative integer. Let (z * t ) t be the auxiliary stochastic process obeying 1.1, 1. (i ≥ 0) and in all stages on T > 1, the strategy σ * plays a fixed action i * ∈ I . On T = 1, in stage n i + t with 1 ≤ t ≤ 2 m the strategy σ * plays the mixed action σ (h[1] 
, we have n j <t≤n j g * t = n j <t≤n j g t . Therefore,
and therefore, as the density of the set of stages ∪ i {t : 
Corollary 2 The game
(q 0 ) has a value v( (q 0 )) = v( p) =v( p).
Lemma 5 Player 2 has an optimal strategy.
Proof Recall that the 5ε-optimal strategy τ * appearing in the proof of Lemma 4 depends on the positive integer , the strategy τ of Player 2 in ( p, 2 m), and the auxiliary nonnegative integer¯ . 
such that if τ * is the strategy of Player 2 that follows τ * [ j] in stages N j−1 < t ≤ N j we have for every positive integer T with
and therefore for every every positive integer T with N j−1 < T ≤ N j we have
For every ε > 0 there is j 0 such that for j ≥ j 0 we have
and therefore τ * is an optimal strategy of Player 2.
Lemma 6 Player 1 has an optimal strategy.
Proof By Aumann and Maschler (1995) , for every there exists p(0, ), . . . , p(|K |, ) ∈ (K ) and a probability vector α(0, ), . . . , α(|K |, ) (i.e., α(i, ) ≥ 0 and 
By the definition of a nonseparating strategy it follows that a nonseparating strategy in 1 (q, ) is a nonseparating strategy in 1 (q , ) whenever the support of q is a subset of the support of q. Therefore,
By possibly replacing the sequence j by another sequence where the jth element of the original sequence, j , repeats itself L j (e.g., 2
j+1 ) times, we may assume in addition that 2 j+1 / i≤ j 2 i → j→∞ 0. Let σ ji be a nonseparating optimal strategy of Player 1 in the game 1 ( p(i), 2 j m). Define the strategy σ of Player 1 as follows.
, choose i with probability β(k, i) and in stages n j < t ≤n j with j ≥ T and z
t]).
In all other cases, σ plays a fixed 5 action i * , i.e., in stages t ≤n T and in stages n j−1 < t ≤ n j as well as in stages n j < t ≤n j with z Proof The proof that Player 1 has a strategy σ * that guaranteesv − ε for every ε > 0 is identical to the proof (in the basic model) that Player 1 has an optimal strategy.
Next, we prove that Player 2 can guarantee v. Let γ n , or ε for short, 7 be a positive number with 0 < ε < 1/2, and let n , or for short, be a sufficiently large positive integer such that (1) for every k ∈ K and z, z ∈ S(k) we have Q m z,z > (1 − ε)k(z ), (2) v( p, m) < v + ε, and (3) for every k ∈ K and z ∈ S(k) Pr(z m+1 = z)
Let τ be an optimal strategy of Player 2 in ( p, m). Fix a positive integer j n and construct the following strategy τ * [n], or τ * for short, of Player 2 in . Set 7 The dependence on n enables us to combine the ε-optimal strategies into an optimal strategy.
